I wrote this essay for my Political Science class earlier this semester. I compared Syria's revolution to that of its neighbors, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Why doesn't the U.S. get involved in Syria? Why is the Syrian revolution taking so much longer than the others? I learned that Syria's situation is more complex than I thought.
-Iman
Syria’s Unique Revolution:
Comparison of the Syrian Uprising to that of its Neighbors
His oversized and corroding portrait hangs in every public building, simulating a forged sense of loyalty and submission to the regime. Statues of his father stand tall at the entrances to every city, as he arrogantly looks off into the distance, apathetic towards the common people. These serve as constant reminders that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad is monitoring every individual’s move, and only with his approval can one succeed in his country. Numerous generations have been born into this pervasive corruption and have yet to see the light of true democracy. Being a daughter of Syrian immigrants and a Syrian citizen myself, I am particularly familiar with the ways of this repressive regime. Every other year I witness first-hand the day-to-day corruption that has penetrated the country for nearly four decades. However, in early 2011, the successful expulsions of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes gave the Syrian citizens a glimpse of Bashar Al-Assad’s analogous fate. On March 15, 2011, protests began to similarly emerge throughout the Syria, as citizens heroically put aside their fears of arrest, torture, and death in hopes of freedom. While the Syrian revolution is comparable to that of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, significant issues complicate the uprising. The different circumstances of the Syrian uprising have increased the difficulty of successfully overthrowing the regime; however, its similarities to other triumphant revolutions in the region provide the protestors with hope.
Firstly, Syria’s army sets its revolution apart from its neighboring revolutions. President Bashar Al-Assad enjoys the absolute loyalty of a military commanded by his nearest companions. All of the generals that he assigns belong to the same Allawi sect of Islam as him, which is a twelve percent minority in Syria. His two hundred thirty thousand strong-army has already killed thousands of unarmed civilians, and imprisoned thousands more (Martin). On the other hand, the Egyptian army stayed essentially neutral throughout the revolution. They refused to slaughter their own neighbors and relatives, despite President Hosni Mubarak’s orders. Similarly, in Libya numerous soldiers abandoned the army, withholding the guns and tanks. The opposition was strengthened with this supply of transferred weaponry. According to foreign affairs analyst Jack Goldstone, in order for a revolution to succeed, elites, especially the military, must feel so alienated from the regime that they are no longer willing to defend it (Goldstone). The army’s diversion or refusal to fire at opponents did not seem to be apparent when the Syrian revolution first began. As of October 2011, ten thousand defectors have formed a coalition, referred to as Syrian Free Army (Oweis). Although it is still insignificant in comparison to the Syrian military, soldiers are deserting every day. However, the principally loyal Assad military sets the Syrian revolution apart from the successful revolutions in the other Arab countries.
Furthermore, there is a significant difference between Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and the leaders of other countries that have undergone uprisings. Al-Assad is younger than Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, and Ali Saleh of Yemen. Al-Assad is foreign-educated and seen as a modernist, attempting to bridge the gap between his father’s socialist regime and the West. Unlike the rest, Bashar met his modern and educated wife, Asma Al-Assad, in London. As opposed to Muammar Gaddafi who is considered a tribal chief, Bashar is often compared to Gaddafi’s son, Seif Al-Gaddafi. Prior to the Gaddafi’s death, they both were viewed as unnatural heirs to their fathers. They are considered passive and feeble compared to their brothers who were both accused of brutal human rights crimes (“Damascus Diary: The”). The traditional and conventional ways of the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen stand in stark contrast with Al-Assad’s customarily modern regime. This difference could possibly complicate the toppling of the current Syrian regime.
Moreover, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the leader of Syria still maintains significant support from a considerable proportion of the population. Certain citizens believe that he is a reformer at heart and is simply controlled by those around him (Fletcher). Unlike Mubarak, who was considered an American marionette, Al-Assad is applauded by numerous citizens for his willingness to stand against the United States and Israel. Residents in the cities of Damascus and Aleppo in particular have not demonstrated in the streets in the same way as the rest of the country. The inhabitants of these cities are generally businesspeople, benefitting from the current regime’s corrupt habits. “A broad-based section of the population, spanning ethnic and religious groups and socioeconomic classes, must mobilize” in order to successfully overthrow a regime, says Goldstone (Goldstone). The entire country must stand together opposing Al-Assad in order to successfully overthrow his regime. This division was not apparent in the other revolutions in the region. Al-Assad’s weakness will be apparent only when all of the key cities in his country stand against him.
The barrier of apprehension has not fallen throughout the country, and oppositions are afraid to release their names for fear of arrest or death. This passiveness portrays submission to the system. This fear lingers throughout the country, and brave citizens who overcome this fear strengthen the resistance. The Assad regime will fall the day that the entire country courageously speaks out against him, similar to the oppositionists in the neighboring revolutions.
Lastly, the Syrian revolution differs from the other Middle Eastern revolutions because of its roots in religion. The Alawites, a Shiite sect of Islam to which twelve percent of Syrians belong, dominate the administration (Cockburn). On the other hand, the protesters in Syria are predominantly Sunni Muslims, whereas in the other revolutions they belonged to a wide array of religions. Christians and Druze Muslims do not expect sympathy from a victorious Sunni regime. Opposition to the Syrian regime is commonly viewed as anti-Shia. This religious root has two possible effects: a possible Western intervention may lead to a civil war in Syria, and the regime’s fall may throw the Middle East into turmoil.
Analysts have predicted that if Western intervention does occur in Syria, a civil war will erupt in the country. Prior to gaining power, the Allawi minority did not have an enormous impact in the government. However, now that the Allawites have grasped control, they fear that they will become inferior if power is transferred to a Sunni regime. In order to prevent this from happening, analysts have predicted that security forces will intensify their attacks on Sunnis and Christians (Montefiore). Experts predict that a civil war between religious sects will erupt if Assad falls, similar to the incidents in Iraq and Lebanon. The tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees living in Syria serve as a reminder of that danger (Fletcher).
In addition, a successful Syrian revolution that is deeply rooted in religious disputes, unlike the other Middle Eastern revolutions, may throw the Middle East into turmoil. The fall of Bashar Al-Assad will not be confined to one country, unlike the fall of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya’s leaders. Syria has continuous support from Iran, a major regional player that is also comprised of Shia elites. Iran has a terrorizing army and is unafraid to boast its strength abroad. Iraqi political scientist Ghassan Attiyah has stated that “if you can't beat Iran, the second best option is to break Syria” (Cockburn). Since Iran is Syria’s continuous supporter, the fall of Syria’s regime would signify weakness for Iran. Iranians may respond to the defeat of their Syrian ally by increasing their presence in Iraq, which is also a predominantly Shia regime. "They will do everything to hold Iraq as their last line of defense," says Dr. Attiyah, "but the country will become a battleground” (Cockburn). In addition to Iran, the fall of the Allawi Syrian regime also implies the weakening of Hezbollah of Lebanon and Hamas of Palestine. Also Shia-dominated, these parties will sense vulnerability with a triumphant Sunni regime in neighboring Syria. Also, the Sunni minority in Iraq will be strengthened with such a transfer of power in Syria (Cockburn). The Sunni minority in Iraq, politically subordinated by the Shiites and Kurds, will be strengthened if a Sunni regime takes over in Damascus, Syria. In essence, unlike the revolutions that occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the Syrian revolution has religious roots that complicate the outcome.
On the other hand, the differences between the Syrian revolution and the other Middle Eastern revolutions may be proven to be insignificant when compared to their similarities. The transformation of so-called republican regimes into monarchies is a depressing trend in the Arab world today, thus linking all of the revolutions in the region. In 2000, Syria was the first of these states to become a de facto monarchy. After the death of Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad, Bashar Al-Assad succeeded his father as President. Prior to his death, Hafez Al-Assad had been the President of Syria for three decades (Goldstone). This transfer of power based on inheritance was expected to occur in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya prior to the revolutions. Hosni Mubarak had plans to pass down his rule to his son, Gamal Mubarak. He made certain that there was no political figure that had prospects of challenging his son’s power. Similar to the Al-Assad regime, the Mubarak regime intimidated individuals it deemed threats through arrest, torture, and even death. Similar to Hafez Al-Assad, Hosni Mubarak retained the presidency of Egypt for thirty years. Prior to the revolution inYemen, Ali Abdallah Saleh was also suspected of grooming his son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, in order to take over for him (Byman). Likewise, prior to Libya’s uprising, Muammar Al-Gaddafi was allegedly planning to pass the reign to his son, Seif Al-Gaddafi. In essence, all of the revolutions that have occurred in the Middle East are similar because of the leaders’ inheritance of power or their plans to pass that power to their sons.
Furthermore, every country in the Middle East that has or is enduring a revolution is contaminated with corruption. The dictators have no purpose other than maintaining their personal authority. As economies in the region develop, the wealth is amassed only by a handful of citizens. The leaders clandestinely amass tremendous wealth from their impoverished citizens, using this money to buy the loyalty of supporters and punish adversaries. While the wealth of the Middle Eastern elites increases, a preponderance of citizens is impoverished and faces increasing food prices and unemployment. These governments deceive the world by simulating elections, political parties, and constitutions, when in effect they are distorted and undemocratic. Assigning key government positions to submissive companions is common throughout the Middle Eastern region (Goldstone).
For instance, the Syrian and Egyptian regimes are both guilty of declaring states of emergency that have lasted decades, allowing them to imprison any critics or oppositionists without trial. The persistence of unrelieved poverty among amassed wealth of the elites is what has triggered revolutions in the Middle Eastern countries. Food prices rose by thirty percent in 2010 alone. Meanwhile that year, Mubarak and his family built up a fortune of between forty and seventy million dollars. At the same time, thirty nine officials and businessmen close to Gamal Mubarak were suspected to have amassed fortunes of about one million dollars each (Goldstone). In 2008, it was revealed that Ben Ali’s family was becoming so rapacious that investment and job creation was being suppressed. From personal experience, I have watched with my own eyes the all-encompassing corruption throughout Syria. In order to process work, government officials require citizens to pay them bribes. Government permission is required for daily undertakings, such as renting a banquet hall. Young men and women are arrested simply so the regime can obtain money from their families for their release. This pervasive corruption is common throughout the countries of the Middle East.
Lastly, all of the countries that have undergone uprisings in the Middle East have been tremendously impacted by social media. Social media has impacted the revolutions in the three ways. Firstly, authorities have incarcerated bloggers and others who have expressed their opinions on the internet. Secondly, authoritarian governments have increased their efforts to monitor, filter, and block websites. Lastly, social media has had an impact on the revolution by increasing the spread of information. Social media is used as an organizing tool to spread information internally and is also used as a broadcasting tool to spread information externally.
All of the countries in the Middle East that have undergone uprisings have incarcerated opponents who have expressed their opinions using social media. Authorities have arrested bloggers and others who have articulated their opinions, communicated via “Facebook” or “Twitter”, or written poetry in ways considered to be insulting to the regime. Hundreds of Middle Eastern activists, poets, and writers have faced repercussions for their online actions (Ghannam). In November 2010, Egyptian blogger Abdel Kareem Nabil Soliman was released after more than four years in prison and alleged torture. He was renowned for his Mubarak defamations (Ghannam). In Syria, 19-year old Tal Al-Mallouhi was alleged to be the youngest internet prisoner of conscious in the region and December 2010 marked her first year in prison. She was imprisoned because she maintained a blog containing poetry in which she conveyed her desires for the freedom of expression.
Secondly, all of Middle Eastern governments in which uprisings have taken place have increased their efforts to monitor, filter, and block websites. Nongovernmental organizations and others critical of the government have also suffered cyber attacks. In the four weeks of protest in Tunisia, governmental authorities blocked access to the social website Twitter. Tunisia’s Ministry of the Interior maintained a department of internet censors nicknamed “Amar 404”, after the 404 message that emerged when a page was blocked. In the same way, Egypt began blocking social media websites such as “Twitter” and “Facebook” on January 25 to disrupt activists who were using the site to plan protests. Three days later, Mubarak cut nearly all of the internet access in the country of Egypt. In 2010, Egypt’s interior ministry also maintained a department of forty five people that solely monitored “Facebook”. I personally have experienced Syria’s monitoring, filtering, and blocking of the internet. When visiting the country in the summer of 2010, I was unable to access websites such as “Facebook” and “Youtube” without an internet proxy. Now that I am back in the United States, I am cautious about everything I mention when talking with my relatives because I know that a government official is most likely monitoring our conversations. Whenever political subjects arise, the internet seemingly disconnects in Syria. In essence, the Middle Eastern governments that have undergone revolutions all have increased their efforts to oversee, filter, and restrict social media websites.
Thirdly, social media has increased the spread of information in all of the revolutions in the Middle East. Social media websites are being used as an internal organization and coordination tool. In a portion of the Middle Eastern region, the internet dominates as the communication tool. In other areas that lack broadband, cell phones and text messaging dominate as the form of communication. Nearly seventeen million people in the region use “Facebook”, available in Arabic, with five million users in Egypt alone (Ghannam). Khaled Koubaa, president of the Internet Society in Tunisia, has stated that “social media was absolutely crucial” during the revolution (Beaumont). Mohammed Bouazizi’s suicide is the event that triggered the revolutions throughout the region. Three months before he burned himself, there was a similar case in another city in Tunisia. However, while the other man’s suicide was not capture on camera, images of Bouazizi were released on “Facebook” and this was what outraged the Tunisians. Citizens of the countries were able to use social media to communicate deaths and injuries, plan protest dates and locations, and other vital revolution information. In essence, all of the countries of the Middle Eastern region that have experienced revolutions have used social media to spread information internally.
In addition, social media websites are being used as external broadcasting tools in the countries undergoing revolutions. Citizens living within the country’s borders used social media websites to inform the rest of the world about the atrocities occurring around them. Twitter hashtags such as “#Sidibouzid” updated followers about the Tunisian uprising, while hashtags “#Jan25” “#Egypt”, “#Mubarak” defined the Egyptian uprising. “There is the army of media-savvy activists who have seized on tools like blogs, Twitter, Facebook and other forms of instant messaging as weapons”, says social media reporter Jeffrey Ghannam (Ghannam). Although Syrian authorities have prohibited journalists from entering the country, residents within are using their cameras and social media as weapons against the government. News of the Tunisian uprisings spread quickly on “Twitter” before it was covered by international mainstream media. Al Jazeera English, the first news agency to cover the story, relied heavily on social media for its reporting (Moore). Omar Amer, representative of the Libyan Youth Movement, based in Britain, claimed that “without the social media, the global reaction to Libya would have been much softer, and very much delayed” (Moore). Social media delivers instantaneous eyewitness reports straight from the source, allowing the people around the world to read about the events in real-time. Personally, I follow “Facebook” and “Twitter” users that live in Syria that are able to directly report about their surroundings. Essentially, social media has dramatically impacted all of the revolutions in the Middle Eastern region in numerous ways.
In essence, the differing circumstances of the Syrian uprising increase the complexity of effectively toppling the regime, but the similarities to other triumphant uprisings in the region provide the oppositionists with optimism. Syria’s revolution is distinct from the other Middle Eastern revolutions because of differences in the military loyalty, the background of the leaders, support from the general population, and roots in religion. However, Syria’s resemblance to the other triumphant revolutions provides hope for the Syrian protestors. Syria is similar to the other countries because of the hereditary transfer of power, prevalent corruption, and the impact of social media on the revolution. Social media is related to all of the revolutions because authorities have imprisoned activists who have voiced their opinions on the internet, have increased their efforts to monitor, filter, and block websites, and social media has assisted with the spread of information, both internally and externally. A successful Syrian revolution has the potential to significantly shift powers throughout the region, thus having an impact on the rest of the world. As the world watches Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Gaddafi collapse, resembling dominos, one can assume that Bashar Al-Assad can foresee his analogous future. His portraits and statues will soon cave in beside him, signifying defeat of forty years of Al-Assad dictatorship.
Works Cited
Beaumont, Peter. “Friends, followers and countrymen: The uprisings in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt have been called 'Twitter revolutions'.” The Guardian. 25 Feb. 2011. Lexis Nexis Academic. Web. 24 Nov 2011.
Byman, Daniel. “Latter-Day Sultans.” National Interest Jul 2010: Issue 108. Elton B. Stephens Company (EPSCO). Web. 28 Nov. 2011.
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Fletcher, Martin. “One swallow doesn't make an Arab Spring;
Egypt and Libya were tinderboxes of discontent, but Syrians lack the passion and power for revolution to ignite”. Lexis Nexis Academic. Web. 24 Nov. 2011. Ghannam, Jeffrey. “Social Media in the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprisings of 2011.” 3 February 2011. The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA). Web. 25 Nov 2011.
Montefiore, Simon S. “Syria is a lame tiger. That's why it's dangerous.” The Times. 26 Nov. 2011. Lexis Nexis Academic. Web. 27 Nov. 2011.
Moore, Jina. “Social media day: Did Twitter and Facebook really build a global revolution?” The Christian Science Monitor. 30 June 2011. Lexis Nexis Academic. Web. 23 Nov 2011. Oweis, Khaled Y. “Syrian soldiers turn against President”. National Post. 1 October 2011. Lexis Nexis Academic. Web. 25 Nov 2011.
